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HOW GOOGLE’S ANDROID BUNDLES COULD 
COST THEM BILLIONS IN THE EU & INDIA
Laura Bassett* 
With the advent of technological advances, many companies who 
formerly were not subject to government scrutiny now find themselves 
being prosecuted for their business practices. Google is one such 
company, whose bundling of applications on Android phones has 
brought scrutiny from countries such as Russia, the United States, and 
India, as well as the European Union. Investigations are pending in the 
European Union and India, currently, and the application of law in those 
cases could yield not only large monetary damages, but also signal a 
shift in the way that technology companies, such as Amazon, Facebook, 
and Apple, think about their legal exposure in these countries and those 
countries that will follow. This Note considers the laws governing an 
abuse of dominance in both the European Union and India and evaluates 
whether Google’s actions regarding the bundling of applications on 
Android software fit within the purview of those laws. This Note argues 
that Google’s actions in that regard will be found anti-competitive under 
the governing European Union law as well as the governing Indian law 
and estimates the damages that Google could face in the European 
Union to be equivalent to the percentage faced in recent precedential 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION
When Larry Page and Sergey Brin started Google in the mid-1990’s, 
they had no way of knowing how big it would become.1 Today, Google 
has grown from a fledgling company housed inside of a garage2 to a 
behemoth conglomerate with interests in cell phones, tablets,3 self-
driving cars,4 internet service,5 and even medical research.6 However, 
this takeover has led Google to pre-load applications, such as G-Mail and 
Google Maps,7 on Android phones in a manner that is coming under fire 
in many countries.8 This practice, called “bundling,” has caused Google 
to be scrutinized for violations of competition laws in the United States,9
Russia,10 the European Union (EU),11 and India.12 In fact, a Russian 
 * J.D. Candidate 2017, Michigan State University College of Law. The author 
would like to thank Professor James M. Chen for his insights and guidance on this topic.
 1. Our History in Depth, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/about/company/history/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
2. Id. at Sept. 1998. 
 3. Id. at Jan. 2010. 
 4. Google Antsy as California Slow on Self-Driving Car Rules, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 16, 2015, 7:53 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-antsy-as-california-
slow-on-self-driving-car-rules/. 
 5. J.D. Sartain, What’s up with Google Fiber?, CIO (Nov. 11, 2015, 5:32 AM), 
http://www.cio.com/article/3004433/internet-service-providers/whats-up-with-google-
fiber.html. 
 6. Davey Alba, Google Aims a $50 Million Moonshot at Curing Heart Disease,
WIRED (Nov. 16, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/google-aims-a-50-
million-moonshot-at-curing-heart-disease/. 
7. Alistair Barr, Google Eases Up on Phone Makers, Drops 4 Apps from Pre-
Install List, WALL ST. J.: BLOG (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:11 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/08/21/google-eases-up-on-phone-makers-drops-4-apps-
from-pre-install-list/. 
 8. Conor Dougherty & Mark Scott, Google Antitrust Inquiries Spread over 
Globe, with India the Latest Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/technology/google-antitrust-investigations-spread-
across-the-globe.html. 
 9. Brody Mullins, Rolfe Winkler & Brent Kendall, Inside the U.S. Antitrust 
Probe of Google, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:38 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-1426793274. 
 10. Ilya Khrennikov, Russia Says Google Broke Antitrust Laws, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 14, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-
14/russia-says-google-broke-antitrust-laws-sending-yandex-soaring.  
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antitrust authority has already determined that Google was guilty of 
violations of Russian antitrust law through its bundling of Google apps 
onto Android devices.13 After the favorable finding of the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service of Russia, Yandex (Google’s biggest Russian 
competitor, holding around 60% of the Russian search engine market14)
requested that the European Commission investigate Google under the 
same theories.15 The Russian court ordered Google to draft new 
agreements that allow previously prohibited third-party apps to be 
installed onto smart phones.16 Yandex stated publicly that it “think[s] that 
the Russian finding of abuse of dominance is instructive, and is a 
conclusion that can readily be adopted in other jurisdictions, including 
the EU.”17 Google appealed the Russian verdict,18 but was denied relief 
by the Moscow Arbitration Court on March 14, 2016.19 If Google does 
not successfully appeal this new ruling, they will need to restructure their 
contracts with device manufacturers and pay up to 15% of the revenue 
 11. James Kanter & Mark Scott, Europe Challenges Google, Seeing Violations of 
Its Antitrust Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/business/international/european-union-google-
antitrust-case.html?_r=1. 
 12. Dougherty & Scott, supra note 8.  
 13. Khrennikov, supra note 10. 
 14. Joseph Nordqvist, Yandex Extends Google Antitrust Battle to the EU, MKT.
BUS. NEWS (Nov. 15, 2015, 9:08AM), http://marketbusinessnews.com/yandex-extends-
google-antitrust-battle-to-the-eu/111585. 
 15. Id.
 16. RESHENIE I PREDPISANIE PO DEPU NO. 1-14-21/00-11-15 [Decision and 
Determination of Case No. 1-14-21/00-11-15, Federal Antimonopoly Service], Sept. 18, 
2015, http://solutions.fas.gov.ru/ca/upravlenie-regulirovaniya-svyazi-i-informatsionnyh-
tehnologiy/ad-54066-15 (Russ.).
 17. Nordqvist, supra note 14.  
 18. Kishalaya Kundu, Google to Appeal Against Russian Antitrust Ruling,
ANDROID HEADLINES (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://www.androidheadlines.com/2015/11/google-appeal-russian-antitrust-ruling.html. 
 19. See Press Release, Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, 
The Court: Google Violated Antimonopoly Legislation (March 14, 2016, 1:06 PM), 
http://en.fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=44968; Patrick Boyle, Russian 
Court Upholds Google Phone App Antitrust Verdict, LAW 360 (March 14, 2016, 7:42
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/771023/russian-court-upholds-google-phone-app-
antitrust-verdict. 
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gained from preloading the applications in 2014.20 Bigger problems still 
lie ahead, though, as European Union Antitrust Chief Margarethe 
Vestager has shown no shyness in going after companies whom she 
thinks are violating EU competition laws.21 Vestager places a high 
priority on investigating Google’s abuses of market dominance, 
demonstrated by the fact that her first act as commissioner was to 
instigate this case against Google for bundling its proprietary apps onto 
Android operating systems.22 Recently Vestager even hinted that there 
might be new charges looming for Google (or Alphabet, as its parent 
company is now known) during an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal.23 Similarly, charges are also pending in India,24 where the 
relatively young Competition Commission of India may seek to prove 
that itself by aggressively pursuing companies who have potentially 
violated Indian competition laws. 
This Note first explains what exactly bundling is, how Google is 
engaging in it, and why this conduct is leading to investigations. Next, it 
explores Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union as well as the Indian Competition Act of 2002, which govern what 
an abuse of dominance is in their respective jurisdictions. Finally, it 
analyzes this conduct under the laws and suggests that Google’s conduct 
is an abuse of dominance as explained in both legal systems and further 
estimates what the damages accompanying unfavorable findings might 
be.
 20. Olga Razumovskaya, Google Fails to Overturn Antitrust Ruling in Russia,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-fails-to-
overturn-antitrust-ruling-in-russia-1457959212. 
21. Foo Yun Chee, EU Antitrust Chief Says Apple, Google Cases Show No U.S. 
Bias, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015, 11:16 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/10/01/uk-eu-
antitrust-apple-google-idUKKCN0RV5UT20151001. 
22. Tom Fairless & Stephen Fidler, EU Antitrust Chief Vestager Speaks About 
Google and Other Key Cases, WALL ST. J.: BLOG (Oct. 26, 2015, 3:17AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/10/26/eu-antitrust-chief-vestager-speaks-about-
google-and-other-key-cases/. 
23. Tom Fairless & Stephen Fidler, EU to Pursue Google Parent Alphabet on 
Multiple Fronts, Vestager Says, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2015, 6:37 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-to-pursue-google-parent-alphabet-on-multiple-fronts-
vestager-says-1445817842. 
24. Dougherty & Scott, supra note 8. 
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WHAT IS BUNDLING?
“Bundling” is exactly what internet service providers25 and insurance 
companies26 have told you: a grouping of items together from a single 
provider. In terms of smart phones, this manifests itself as multiple 
applications from the same service provider pre-loaded onto your phone; 
specifically, Google requires manufacturers to pre-install eleven 
applications if the manufacturers want to pre-install Google’s most 
popular applications (i.e. Gmail, Maps, or Google Play).27 Ewan Spence 
explained that “[bundles] help differentiate brands running a similar 
operating system, they help focus users on the abilities of specific models 
from a single manufacturer, and arguably the inclusion of an application 
in the distribution can be a revenue stream with ‘pay for placement’ or 
the leveraging of in-app purchasing.”28 However, Spence also notes that 
these pre-loaded, bundled apps can be impossible to remove from 
phones, providing examples such as Newsstand on Apple devices, Office 
and OneNote from Windows Phone, and most pre-loaded apps on 
Android devices.29 Of course, therein lies the problem for Google’s 
presence on Android devices.  
BUNDLING AND ANTITRUST LAW
This seemingly innocuous practice has run afoul of antitrust and 
competition laws in countries around the globe for a few very important 
reasons: the ease of use, the inability to uninstall the apps, and the so-
25. Save A Bundle: How to Piece Together a Great Deal for TV, Phone, and 
Internet Service, CONSUMER REPORTS MAG. (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2010/february/electronics-and-
computers/bundling/overview/bundling-ov.htm. 
 26. Rick Mikolasek, Progressive Bundling Review, THE TRUTH ABOUT 
INSURANCE (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.thetruthaboutinsurance.com/progressive-
bundling-review/. 
 27. Barr, supra note 7. 
 28. Ewan Spence, Bundled Applications Are Here to Stay on Your Smartphone,
FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 6:50 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2014/01/27/bundled-applications-are-here-to-
stay-on-your-smartphone/#30ef39a73b8b. 
 29. Id.
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called adoption factor.30 As Spence states, “[i]f a user is looking to share 
a picture online they will generally look to the built-in and bundled apps 
first of all before heading to the app store. If they want an [app]… the 
bundled apps will get the first bite of the cherry.”31 Furthermore, Spence 
states that Androids come with pre-bundled apps aimed at the general 
public who cannot remove them from within the software, which furthers 
the “adoption factor.”32
The verdicts of the pending cases against Google (particularly the EU 
case)33 will shape the way that other tech companies, such as Amazon, 
Apple, and Facebook,34 do business around the world. EU verdicts have 
led to a domino effect of similar verdicts in the past, which could 
continue to spell trouble for Google and these other companies in the 
future.35
EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAWS
The EU has not hesitated to make and enforce competition laws that 
many have deemed “protectionist.”36 Antitrust Chief Margrethe Vestager 
has expressed her distaste for settling antitrust claims, in contrast to her 
predecessor, who encouraged settling to deal with claims more quickly.37
While settlement is still possible for Google, Kanter & Scott note that it 
would have been a less impactful settlement if Google had chosen to 
settle with former Antitrust Chief Joaquín Almunia during his three 
previous attempts to settle.38 Vestager has aggressively pursued cases for 
mergers, tax deals, and cartels against companies such as Amazon, 
 30. Id.
 31. Id.
 32. Id.
 33. Dougherty & Scott, supra note 8 (“While not explicitly related to Google’s 
continuing antitrust problems in Europe, India’s accusations . . . are similar.”). 
 34. Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, EU and Google: Study in Divergence for 
Antitrust Enforcement, 253 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/070051516Skadden.pdf. 
 35. Dougherty & Scott, supra note 8. 
 36. Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 34. 
 37. Christian Barker & Alex Oliver, Europe Antitrust Chief Not Afraid of 
Starting a Fight, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015, 5:23 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa6d25b4-c3ff-11e4-a02e-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3ncVgOU00. 
 38. Kanter & Scott, supra note 11. 
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Starbucks, and Apple, as well as Japanese car companies in her year-long 
tenure.39 However, the case against Google (as well as the potential for 
actions against Facebook) has brought new political pressure from 
outside of Europe by American President Barack Obama.40 This pressure 
will probably not affect Vestager’s decision about whether to push 
forward, though, if her formal accusations against Russian oil company 
OAO Gazprom (despite the political implications) can be taken as 
dispositive.41
To proceed with this case, Vestager and the European Commission 
will need to look to the source of the competition law in the European 
Union. Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union addresses the charge of abuse of dominance that Google is 
currently facing.42 Specifically, Article 102 states that  
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
 39. Chee, supra note 21. 
 40. Kanter & Scott, supra note 11 (explaining that Facebook’s protection of 
online data is under scrutiny by the EU’s privacy watchdog). 
 41. Fairless & Fidler, supra note 23. 
 42. Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of Dominance (Article 102 TFEU cases),
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html 
(last updated July 2013) [hereinafter Article 102 TFEU Cases]. 
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according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts.43
The Commission will first determine whether the company is actually 
dominant in the relevant market, which will either be a geographic or a 
product market.44 A relevant geographic market is defined as “an area in 
which the conditions of competition for a given product are 
homogenous,” and the relevant product market is determined to be all 
similar items at similar prices that could be considered substitutes for the 
product in question.45 Next, the European Commission will look at the 
market share of the company within the relevant market as compared to 
the market shares of the company’s competitors.46 The market share and 
the period of time over which the company has held that market share are 
important in determining dominance, but the Commission notes that “[i]f 
a company has a market share of less than 40%, it is unlikely to be 
dominant.”47 Other factors will be considered by the Commission, such 
as barriers to market entry, countervailing buyer power, the overall 
strength and size of the company, and whether the company is vertically 
integrated.48
If a company is ultimately found to be in a dominant position within 
the relevant market, the Commission will then be tasked with 
determining whether an abuse has occurred.49 Potential examples of such 
abuses are: “requiring that buyers purchase all units of a particular 
product only from the dominant company (exclusive purchasing); setting 
prices at a loss-making level (predation); refusing to supply input 
indispensable for competition in an ancillary market; [and] charging 
excessive prices.”50 The Commission can also choose to start an 
investigation and, at the close of the investigation, the Commission can 
 43. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. 
 44. Article 102 TFEU Cases, supra note 42. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.
 50. Id. 
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choose to issue a Statement of Objections listing the objections against 
the company.51
If a company receives a Statement of Objections, the company can 
invoke its rights of defense.52 These rights include being able to see the 
non-confidential findings of the investigation against them and a chance 
to request an oral hearing before an independent Hearing Officer.53
However, if the Commission is still concerned after the exercise of these 
rights of defense, the Commission will draft a decision that will then be 
given to the Advisory Committee for approval before the College of 
Commissioners adopts the decision.54 After adoption, the Commission 
may use fines as a punishment and a deterrent, where the maximum level 
is 10% of the overall annual turnover of the company.55
In regards to damages, the European Commission has created a 
private cause of action for businesses affected by the alleged abuses: the 
Commission explicitly states that “[a]ny citizen or business which suffers 
harm as a result of a breach of the EU competition rules should be 
entitled to claim compensation from the party who caused it” and that 
victims are entitled to bring claims in national courts.56 The 
Commission’s goal in levying fines against companies who violate 
competition laws is to prevent future violations.57 The basic fine is a 
percentage of whatever the relevant sales of the offending product are, 
usually measured during the last year of the infringement.58 The fine can 
be up to 30% of the company’s relevant sales and will fluctuate 
depending on the severity of the infringement.59 The fine will then be 
multiplied to reflect the amount of time during which the abuse was 
occurring, so as to properly punish “damage to the economy caused by 
the infringement over time” by relating the value of the fine to the value 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.
 56. Id. 
 57. Fines for Breaking EU Competition Law, EUROPEAN COMM’N, (Nov. 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/factsheet_fines_en.pdf [hereinafter 
Fines]. 
 58. Id.
 59. Id.
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gained through sales during the infringement.60 This amount is subject to 
be either increased or decreased, depending on factors such as recidivism 
or legislative justifications, respectively.61 The limit for the total penalty 
is 10% of the company’s (or group’s, if the violations are restricted to a 
single group within a larger parent company) annual turnover.62
The parties are allowed to appeal the Commission’s decision to the 
General Court, at which point the General Court may “cancel, increase[,] 
or reduce the fine imposed by the Commission.”63 However, the 
Commission’s record on appeal shows that, while the courts have the 
ability to change the amount of the fines that have been leveed, over 90% 
of the value of the fines is upheld.64 The unsuccessful party in a General 
Court decision may appeal to the Court of Justice, as long as such an 
appeal concerns a question of law and not a question of fact.65
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission 
The European Commission pursued a case against Microsoft in 200366
for anti-competitive practices related to its bundling of applications onto 
Windows operating systems.67 Specifically, the European Commission 
took exception to the fact that Microsoft had been bundling Windows 
Media Player on all computers running Windows operating system.68
Beginning in 2000 with a Statement of Objections concerning the 
interoperability of Windows with “third-party server operating systems,” 
the Commission continued its investigation into Microsoft by issuing a 
 60. Id.
 61. Id.
 62. Id.
 63. Article 102 TFEU Cases, supra note 42. 
 64. Fines, supra note 57. 
 65. Article 102 TFEU Cases, supra note 42. 
 66. Timeline of European Commission Case Against Microsoft, MICROSOFT 
NEWS CENTER, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/european/04-24-
06eccasetimeline.mspx (last updated Sept. 2007). 
 67. Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on 
Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 485 (2009). 
 68. Id. at 483, 485.
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second Statement of Objections in 2001, this time regarding Windows 
Media Player being tied to Windows operating systems.69
A third Statement of Objections was published against Microsoft in 
August of 2003 that reaffirmed the Commission’s two prior Statements 
of Objections, preliminarily concluded that the alleged abuses were 
ongoing, and provisionally recommended a remedy, along with two 
alternative remedies, to even the competitive playing field.70 In October 
2003, Microsoft responded to the Commission’s allegations with a 
rebuke, stating that the Commission’s evidence did not support its 
conclusion about Microsoft’s alleged abuses; however, Microsoft still 
continued the settlement negotiations that they had begun in 2002, 
following the second Statement of Objections.71
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti ended the settlement 
discussions on March 18, 2004 and on March 24, 2004 the European 
Commission found against Microsoft and ordered them to offer a version 
of their operating system with no pre-loaded Windows Media Player.72
Microsoft was also forbidden to incentivize people to purchase the 
version of Windows that included Windows Media Player.73 The 
Commission voluntarily suspended these obligations while Microsoft 
appealed the decision, but the obligations were reinstated on December 
22, 2004 following the European Court of First Instance’s rejection of 
the appeal.74 During that appeal, Microsoft tried to argue that its 
inclusion of the Windows Media Player on its operating systems was no 
different than Apple’s inclusion of iTunes on Mac OS and iOS; however, 
this argument was still not persuasive enough to convince the 
Commission to forgo punishing Microsoft as the dominant player.75
 69. MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, supra note 66. 
 70. Microsoft Case, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/microsoft/investigation.html (last updated 
Apr. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Microsoft Case]. 
 71. MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, supra note 66. 
 72. Id.
 73. Economides & Lianos, supra note 67, at 484. 
 74. Implementation of the Decision, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/microsoft/implementation.html (last updated 
June 27, 2012). 
 75. A Bittersweet Win over Microsoft, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/9823880. 
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Microsoft released Windows XP N in June 2005, which was intended 
to comply with these measures.76 However, despite the Commission 
being “happy” with Microsoft’s progress in June 2005,77 the Commission 
adopted further sanctions against Microsoft for non-compliance with the 
2004 order under Article 24(1) of Regulation 1/2003.78 On September 17, 
2007, the Court of First Instance upheld the Commission’s abuse of 
dominance finding, but criticized the Commission’s imposition of a 
separate trustee to oversee all of Microsoft’s required disclosures.79
Microsoft was ordered to pay 80% of the Commission’s legal costs for 
the appeal, and the Commission had to pay for a specified part of 
Microsoft’s costs, as well.80
Building on the reasoning and the Court of First Instance’s 2007 
verdict regarding Windows Media Player, the European Commission 
sent a Statement of Objections to Microsoft regarding the bundling of 
Internet Explorer on computers running Windows on January 15, 2009.81
The Statement of Objections outlined the Commission’s concerns that by 
including Internet Explorer on Windows, Internet Explorer had access to 
90% of the world’s PC users, while other browsers lacked the 
opportunity to reach a similar percentage of the market.82 In December 
2009, Microsoft committed to allowing its European users the ability to 
install any browser onto their Windows computers, as well as providing a 
browser choice screen for those users for whom Internet Explorer was 
the default browser.83 This was to be instituted on new computers, as 
well as previously purchased versions of Windows XP, Windows Vista, 
 76. MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, supra note 66. 
 77. Id.
 78. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 74. 
 79. Microsoft Loses Anti-Trust Appeal, BBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2007, 10:45 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6998272.stm. 
 80. Id.
 81. Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of Objections to 
Microsoft on the Tying of Internet Explorer to Windows, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 17, 
2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-15_en.htm?locale=en [hereinafter 
Statement of Objections]. 
 82. Id.
 83. Microsoft Statement on European Commission Decision, MICROSOFT CORP.
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://news.microsoft.com/2009/12/16/microsoft-statement-on-
european-commission-decision/. 
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and Windows 7 in Europe.84 Microsoft also committed to ensuring that 
their products and services were interoperable with third-party products 
and services at the same time as they announced their commitment to 
allowing web browser choices.85
While these promises seemed to provide an amicable end to an almost 
decade-long battle, Microsoft came under fire once more in 2013 for 
failing to uphold the 2009 commitments that it had made.86 The 
European Commission fined Microsoft €561 million (equivalent to $731 
million at the time) after an investigation revealed that Microsoft had 
failed to provide the promised browser choice to users during the period 
of May 2011 to July 2012.87 Microsoft apologized, cut CEO Steve 
Ballmer’s bonus, and blamed both a “technical error” and an executive 
who had recently left the company for the failure.88 While the sanction 
represented 11% of Microsoft’s profits for the quarter, it didn’t rise to the 
allowable 10% of annual global revenue; however, it was the first 
sanction to be levied on the basis of a failure to meet obligations and 
communicated a renewed vigor towards compliance by the 
Commission.89 Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia intended 
the sanction to be a warning to companies to keep their legally-binding 
commitments and noted that the commission had been “naïve” in 2009 to 
not provide more oversight through an external trustee.90
Though the Microsoft case was one of the most significant cases in 
recent memory due to its impact and the longevity of the proceedings,91
Microsoft was not the only large enterprise against whom the European 
Commission pursued a case for abuse of dominance in the past decade. 
 84. Id.
 85. Id.
 86. Foo Yun Chee, EU Fines Microsoft $731 Million for Broken Promise, Warns 
Others, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2013, 7:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
microsoft-idUSBRE92500520130307.
 87. Id.
 88. Id.
 89. Id.
 90. Id.
 91. See James Kanter, European Regulators Fine Microsoft, Then Promise to Do 
Better, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/technology/eu-
fines-microsoft-over-browser.html (stating that Microsoft was a “special case,” a 
“milestone,” and the first company to garner such penalties over the decade of the case). 
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Intel Corp. v. Commission 
Another important European Commission decision to consider is Intel
v. Commission.92 This case stemmed from Advanced Micro Devices’ 
complaint about Intel’s unfair use of rebates in the United States and in 
the European Union.93 During an eight-year long investigation by the 
European Union, Intel was found to have offered rebates to computer 
manufacturers who purchased at least 95% of their chips from Intel from 
2002-2005.94 Dell, Hewlett-Packard, NEC, and Lenovo all received 
rebates to purchase Intel chips, and the German retail store Media Saturn 
Holding received rebates for only stocking computers that contained 
Intel chips.95 These alleged offenses amounted to an abuse of dominance 
under the competition laws of the European Union according to Article 
82 (now Article 102 in the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union96) and precedential cases.97
Intel received an unfavorable verdict from the European Commission 
in 2009, which was upheld by the General Court in 2014.98 The General 
Court quoted precedent stating that any agreement, whether voluntary or 
coerced, in which a dominant player incentivizes or otherwise entices a 
company to buy all or most of what they need from the dominant player 
 92. Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.L.I. 547, ¶ 20, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153576&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=385422. 
 93. Aoife White & Stephanie Bodoni, Intel Says EU Withheld Evidence in 
Antitrust Case, BLOOMBERG TECH. (July 3, 2012, 7:36 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-02/intel-to-say-eu-withheld-evidence-
mitigating-1-34-billion-fine. 
 94. Id.
 95. Foo Yun Chee, Intel Loses Court Challenge Against $1.4 Billion EU Fine,
REUTERS (June 12, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-intel-court-eu-
idUSKBN0EN0M120140612. 
 96. With the passage of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Rome Treaty (officially, the 
“Treaty Establishing the European Community”) and the Maastricht Treaty (officially, 
the “Treaty on the European Union”) were consolidated and their articles were 
renumbered. The case being discussed for its precedential value was decided prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and therefore, refers to Article 82, which has 
since been renumbered as Article 102. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European 
Council (July 20, 2007), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf. 
 97. Intel Corp., 2014 E.C.L.I. 547, ¶ 20. 
 98. Chee, supra note 95. 
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is a violation of Article 82.99 The precedential case, Hoffmann-La Roche,
classified rebates as being in one of three categories: quantity rebates, 
fidelity/exclusivity rebates, or “rebates falling within the third 
category.”100 Quantity rebates are given based on the quantity ordered 
from the company and they are not an abuse of dominance because they 
impose no requirement in exchange for the rebate.101 The second 
category of rebates, known as exclusivity rebates or fidelity rebates, are 
given only if a buyer purchases most or all of what they need from the 
seller offering the rebate; when the seller offering the rebates is already 
holding a dominant position in the market, this practice will violate 
competition laws due to the fact that they are “designed to remove or 
restrict the purchaser’s freedom to choose his sources of supply and to 
deny other producers access to the market.”102 Finally, the third category 
includes rebates that, for example, are offered once a sales objective is 
met and, so long as that objective does not constitute an exclusivity 
agreement, these rebates will not typically violate competition laws.103
The Commission had accused Intel of enticing Dell, Lenovo, HP, and 
others to purchase its products through the second type of rebates, 
exclusivity/fidelity rebates.104 The General Court agreed with the 
Commission that Intel’s rebates fell under the second category,105 a lethal 
verdict considering that the Commission had found that Intel held “in 
excess of  or around 70%” of the relevant CPU market.106 Furthermore, 
the General Court stated that “[t]he Commission demonstrated to the 
requisite legal standard that Intel attempted to conceal the anti-
competitive nature of its practices and implemented a long term 
comprehensive strategy to foreclose AMD from the strategically most 
important sales channels.”107 The General Court also supported the 
amount of the fine despite it being the largest fine ever levied in such a 
case because the amount of the fine (€1.06 billion, or the equivalent of 
 99. Intel Corp., 2014 E.C.L.I. 547, ¶ 72. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 75–78. 
 101. Id. ¶ 75. 
 102. Id. ¶¶ 76–77. 
 103. Id. ¶ 78. 
 104. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. 
 105. Id. ¶ 79. 
 106. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25. 
 107. Chee, supra note 95 (citing Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 
E.C.L.I. 547, ¶¶ 273, 1551).  
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$1.44 billion, at the time) only rose to about 4.15% of Intel’s 2008 
turnover instead of the up-to 10% of turnover that the Commission could 
have enacted.108 Intel faced a large amount of scrutiny in many different 
countries during this time in an analogous situation to the one in which 
Google currently finds itself. Intel settled their U.S. cases by paying 
AMD $1.25 billion and an undisclosed amount to the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission in 2009.109 The Competition Commission of India also 
launched an inquiry into Intel in 2014, resulting in a favorable verdict 
towards Intel and exemplifying the differences between Indian 
competition law and other countries.110 Looking forward, it will be 
extremely important for Google to understand these differences as their 
case proceeds in India.  
INDIAN COMPETITION LAW
There have been two acts that have controlled India’s competition 
laws: the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPA) of 
1969111 and its successor the Indian Competition Act of 2002.112 The 
former prohibited “restrictive trade practices” and activities that did not 
“genuinely benefit the ultimate consumer.”113 Other than that, the 
MRTPA lacked many prohibitions that were later incorporated in the 
Competition Act: “abuse of dominance” was not specifically barred or 
defined, although it was somewhat included under the general 
 108. Id.
 109. White & Bodoni, supra note 93. 
 110. Amit Kapur, Farhad Sorabjee & Amitabh Kumar, India, J. SAGAR ASSOCS. 1,
7 (2014), http://www.jsalaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/VA2014-India-final2.pdf. 
 111. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, No. 54, Acts of 
Parliament, 1969 (India), 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/annual_reports/annualreport2006/CHAPTER4.pdf.  
 112. Competition Act, 2002, No. 12, § 27, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India), 
www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/cci_pdf/competitionact2012.pdf [hereinafter 
Competition Act] 
http://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Indian%20Competition%20
Law_The%20Corporate%20International%20Magazine.PDF. 
 113. Samir R. Gandhi & Rahul Rai, Lessons from Intel’s $1.45 Billion Fine, BUS.
TODAY (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/columns/lessons-from-
intels-$1.45-billion-fine/story/4599.html (citing Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act, 1969, No. 54, Acts of Parliament, 1969 (India), 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/annual_reports/annualreport2006/CHAPTER4.pdf). 
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prohibition of “monopolistic trade practices” that was included in 
Chapter IV of the MRTPA.114 The Competition Act established the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) and “entrusted [the CCI] with 
the duty to regulate and eliminate practices having an adverse effect on 
competition in India.”115 The Competition Act is based off of similar 
legislation in the European Union, and it “prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position by any ‘enterprise’ or ‘group’, and defines dominant 
position as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant 
market in India,” which allows the business/enterprise “to operate 
independently of the competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market 
or affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its 
favour.”116 This is a departure from the previously “toothless” 
Monopolies Restrictive and Trade Practices Act of 1969.117
According to a presentation by former Additional Director General of 
the CCI, G.R. Bhatia, abuse of dominance is prohibited when there is  
[i]mposition of unfair or discriminatory condition in the purchase or 
sale of goods or services or their prices, [l]imiting or restricting 
production or technical development, [d]enial of market access, 
[s]upplementary obligations, [or] [u]se of dominant position in one 
market to protect or enter into another.118
The specific sanctions at the CCI’s disposal are detailed in Section 27 
of the Competition Act and include, but are not limited to, imposing 
fines, ordering the enterprise to cease and desist the abusive behavior,119
 114. PRASHANT PRAKHAR ET AL., NISHITH DESAI ASSOCIATES, COMPETITION LAW 
IN INDIA: A REPORT ON JURISPRUDENTIAL TRENDS 11 (June 2015), 
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Competiti
on_Law_in_India.pdf.
 115. Cyril Shroff & Nisha Kaur Uberoi, India: Abuse of Dominance, ASIA-PACIFIC 
ANTITRUST REV. 1, 1 (2015),
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/69/sections/235/chapters/2749/.
 116. Id.
 117. Kumkum Sen, ‘Toothless’ MRTP is Laid to Rest, BUS. STANDARD (Sept. 14, 
2009), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/-toothless-mrtp-is-laid-
to-rest-109091400054_1.html. 
 118. G.R. Bhatia, Add’l. Dir. Gen., Competition Comm’n of India, Presentation: 
Abuse of Dominance in Fact and in Law, http://www.competition-commission-
india.nic.in/competition_forum/ABUSE%20OF%20DOMINANCE.pdf.
 119. Competition Act § 27. 
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and even directing the division of the enterprise, as provided for in 
Section 28.120
When the CCI decides to impose monetary sanctions or penalties, 
they are allowed to impose up to 10% of the offending company’s 
average turnover for the prior three years.121 These penalties, the highest 
allowed in India, are completely at the discretion of the CCI, and no 
guidelines or clear reasoning from prior cases are provided.122 The CCI is 
not alone in this practice, though – the Competition Appellate Tribunal 
(COMPAT) has also failed to consistently enforce and apply its 
decisions.123 Specifically, COMPAT has said that the turnover that is 
subject to the penalty should be the relevant turnover that can be 
attributed to the infraction; however, the CCI has disregarded this 
restriction and imposed penalties based on the entire turnover of the 
business in its decisions.124 One such decision where the CCI assessed 
damages based on overall turnover, M/s DLF Limited v. Competition 
Commission of India & Ors (COMPAT DLF), was upheld by the 
COMPAT, despite the supposed overreach of the CCI in calculating the 
turnover upon which the damages should be based.125 The only thing that 
the CCI is potentially prohibited from doing is completely changing the 
language of an agreement, as it also tried to do in COMPAT DLF.126
COMPAT DLF has been appealed to the Supreme Court of India by the 
CCI on whether or not the CCI is allowed to order a complete 
transformation of the language of an agreement.127 The case is pending, 
following an order for DLF to keep 630 crore rupees (roughly $94.7 
million USD at the time of this writing) in an interest-bearing account 
during the proceedings.128 There are also factors that the CCI can accept 
 120. Id. § 28. 
 121. Shroff & Uberoi, supra note 115, at 5. 
 122. Id.
 123. Id. at 6. 
 124. Id.
 125. Id.
 126. Id. at 6–7. 
 127. Id. at 7. 
 128. Supreme Court Tells DLF to Pay Rs 630 cr Fine, BUS. STANDARD (Aug. 28, 
2014, 12:59 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/sc-rejects-dlf-
plea-directs-company-to-pay-rs-630-cr-114082700468_1.html. 
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as mitigating the harm, but they are not specifically codified as such and 
are rarely applied.129
RELEVANT MARKET
The first step toward determining whether there has been an abuse of 
dominance in India is to define the relevant market.130 The Competition 
Act defines a relevant market as “the market which may be determined 
by the [Competition] Commission with reference to the relevant product 
market or the relevant geographic market or with reference to both the 
markets.”131 The CCI has determined areas as small as single suburbs to 
be relevant markets and has also determined the relevant market to be the 
entire country of India in cases without substantial differences.132
Although there are no specific guidelines for how the CCI should 
determine the relevant market, a major factor in the decisions appears to 
be whether the other products that are in the relevant market could be 
demanded as substitutes for the offending enterprise’s goods or 
services.133 This standard is subjective, however, because certain 
products that could be considered substitutes for each other have been 
held to be in different markets by the CCI for the purposes of 
competition complaints. In In re Mr. Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal.com and 
Ors, the CCI determined that the online market and the brick and mortar 
market for the same product were different distribution channels within 
the same market.134 However, in the recent Shri Shamsher Kataria v. 
Honda Siel Cars India Ltd & Ors, the CCI held that after-market and 
spare car parts were not part of the same market as new cars or car repair 
services.135 Not only was the market broken into those three categories, 
but it was also classified by the specific maker of the car/car part, in 
which area each original equipment manufacturer was determined to 
 129. Shroff & Uberoi, supra note 115, at 4. 
 130. PRAKHAR ET AL., supra note 114, at 35. 
 131. Competition Act § 2(r). 
 132. Shroff & Uberoi, supra note 115, at 2. 
 133. Id.
 134. Id.
 135. Id. at 2–3. 
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have a 100% market share (i.e. Honda has a 100% share of the Honda 
spare parts market).136
While the CCI has a tendency to use the substitution factor and has 
held that a global market cannot be considered a relevant market, there is 
no commitment to consistency in the CCI’s decision that would lend 
itself to predictions of how the market will be defined in the future.137 As 
one report from practitioners in the Indian market stated,  
[u]nfortunately, it [is] hard to predict any form of trend in identifying 
[the] relevant market and it is hard to evolve a set of principles that can 
be applied in future cases. This difficulty can also be attributed to the 
nature of [the] exercise that is to be adopted for ascertaining [the] 
relevant market and it is undoubtedly fraught with some uncertainty.138
ASSESSMENT OF THE ENTERPRISE’S DOMINANCE
The second determination that needs to be made is of the enterprise’s 
dominance in the relevant market.139 The Competition Act defines 
“dominant position” in Section 4 as meaning “a position of strength, 
enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India, which enables 
it to – (i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the 
relevant market; or (ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant 
market in its favour.”140 The CCI is required by Section 19(4) of the 
Competition Act to consider various factors related to both the accused 
party and its competition/market environment when making a 
determination on anti-competitive practices.141 The CCI must consider 
the following factors in relation to the accused party: “market share; size 
and resources of the enterprise… economic power of the enterprise, 
including commercial advantages over competitors; vertical integration 
of the enterprises or sale or service network of such enterprises; 
dependence of consumers on the enterprise; legal monopoly or dominant 
position.”142 The CCI is also required to consider the following factors 
 136. Id. at 3. 
 137. Id. at 2. 
 138. PRAKHAR ET AL., supra note 114, at 36. 
 139. Shroff & Uberoi, supra note 115, at 1. 
 140. Competition Act § 4.  
 141. Shroff & Uberoi, supra note 115, at 1. 
 142. Id.
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relating to the competitors and the market environment in which the 
competition is occurring: “size and importance of competitors . . . entry 
barriers. . . countervailing buyer power; market structure and size of the 
market; social obligations and social costs; relative advantage, by way of 
the contribution to the economic development, by the dominant 
enterprise; or any other [relevant factors].”143 The CCI specifically 
considered factors such as market share, customer brand loyalty, barriers 
to market entry, and intellectual property rights when assessing 
dominance in a case brought against Intel in India (In Re M/s ESYS 
Information Technologies Pvt Ltd and Intel Corporation (Intel Inc) & 
Ors).144
ASSESSMENT OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR
The final step in an abuse of dominance case is to assess the allegedly 
abusive behavior.145 Section 4(2) of the Competition Act provides a 
seemingly exhaustive list of what can be considered an abuse of a 
dominant position by an enterprise.146 Section 4(2) can be summarized 
into four categories of offenses: 
i. anti-competitive practices of imposing unfair or 
discriminatory trading conditions or prices or predatory 
prices,
ii. limiting the supply of goods or services, or a market or 
technical or scientific development, denying market access, 
iii. imposing supplementary obligations having no 
connection with the subject of the contract, or 
 143. Id. at 1–2. 
 144. Id. at 3. 
 145. Id. at 1. 
 146. PRAKHAR ET AL., supra note 114, at 26. 
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iv. using dominance in one market to enter into or protect 
another relevant market.147
There is, however, an exception where these practices will not be 
considered abuses of a dominant position if they are taken in response to 
the market and needed for the enterprise to meet its competition.148 The 
list of abuses is very similar to, and possibly inspired by, those 
enumerated in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.149 If this list is truly exhaustive,150 Google and all 
companies currently operating in or wishing to operate in India in the 
future will be safe from unfavorable verdicts if they can show that they 
have not committed one of the listed abuses or that they had to commit 
the abuses to meet competition.151
ANALYSIS
The verdicts of these upcoming decisions will be important, not only 
for Google, but also for technology companies in the future. In an area 
dominated by companies who can innovate and create a market for a 
product never before seen, it can be both beneficial and dangerous to 
capture the market fully. India and the European Union’s filing of cases 
against Google show that no company will be safe if it becomes too big 
and engages in practices that can be seen as anticompetitive. 
The European Parliament resolved, in a non-binding vote, to break 
Google up in November 2014 because of Google’s 90% or more market 
share in the European Union search market.152 Furthermore, the New 
York Times reported that 81% of the phones in the world market use an 
Android operating system, while 15% use Apple’s iOS, and less than 3% 
use Microsoft’s operating system.153 Pre-installing software and 
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
 149. Id.
 150. Id.
 151. Competition Act § 4(2). 
 152. Maya Kosoff, Europe is About to Drop the Boom on Google, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 21, 2015, 9:44 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-expected-to-face-
antitrust-charges-in-europe-next-month-2015-3. 
 153. Kanter & Scott, supra note 11. 
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applications is relatively normal; however, Google’s large market share 
(as well as Android’s market dominance) is what brings it under scrutiny 
at this time.154
Of the two cases presented, Microsoft’s facts are more similar to the 
case at hand: both companies were and are accused of preloading 
software onto devices running a dominant operating system.155
Furthermore, Android’s 81% market share156 is just shy of being at the 
same level as Microsoft’s market share at the time that Microsoft was 
accused of abusing its dominance by bundling Internet Explorer onto 
PCs.157 Considering the gap between the two market shares (9%) is fairly 
marginal once a company attains the type of dominance that Microsoft 
and Google have respectively reached, it would be hard to imagine that 
this discrepancy would lead the European Commission to distinguish the 
situations when considering how to rule. Looking to the European 
Commission’s recent history of deciding cases,158 the issue appears to be 
not if Google will be found to be abusing its market dominance, but 
rather what the damages will be when Google is ultimately found in 
violation of competition law in the European Union. 
The European Commission officially launched an investigation into 
Google’s bundling practices of its apps on Android phones in April 
2015159 and issued a Statement of Objections laying out the specific 
abuses alleged on April 20, 2016.160 Specifically, the Competition 
Commission alleged that Google had violated EU competition laws by 
obligating device manufacturers to preload Google Search and Google 
 154. Id.
 155. Id.; Robert Wielaard, Microsoft Loses E.U. Antitrust Case, WASH. POST (Jan. 
17, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/ 
AR2009011604570.html (noting Microsoft’s bundling trouble regarding both Windows 
Media Player and Internet Explorer). 
 156. Kanter & Scott, supra note 11. 
 157. Statement of Objections, supra note 81. 
 158. See, e.g., Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.L.I. 547; see also
Microsoft Case, supra note 70. 
 159. Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation Against Google in 
Relation to Android Mobile Operating System, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4782_en.htm. 
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Operating System and Applications, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm. 
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Chrome as a prerequisite to being able to install other Google 
applications.161 In addition, the Commission also alleged that Google 
incentivized manufacturers to exclusively install their applications and 
precluded manufacturers from selling rival software that was derived 
from Android’s open source code.162 The Commission further delineated 
its grievances by explaining that the licensing agreements between 
Google and the manufacturers require the installation of Google Search 
(which must be the default search engine) in exchange for being able to 
install the Google Play Store on phones.163 Furthermore, Google has been 
requiring its partners to sign “anti-fragmentation agreements” that 
prohibit the “forking” of Android software to create a modified operating 
system, even though the Android code is open source.164 The 
Commission alleges that behavior such as this stifles innovation and 
denies the consumer the chance to have a superior version of the 
software.165 Finally, Google has allegedly provided “significant financial 
incentives” for companies that are willing to exclusively install Google’s 
products on their smartphones and tablets, thereby reducing any 
incentive that a manufacturer could gain from installing any competing 
products.166
If the European Commission levies the maximum amount of damages 
against Google, it would be the largest verdict in the history of European 
Union competition law – the current holder of that title is Intel for its 
€1.06 billion ($1.44 billion, in 2014) fine.167 However, even though 
Intel’s is the largest fine thus far, it only rose to 4.15% of annual turnover 
for the computer chip maker.168 Instead of assuming that the European 
Commission will levy the maximum 10% penalty (costing Google 
around €6 billion169), it could conservatively be estimated that the 
European Commission would levy a fine of a similar percentage as in the 
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Intel case. In that scenario, Google would still be paying roughly €2.5 
billion, or the equivalent of over $2.7 billion at the time of writing.170
As illustrated by the Microsoft case in the European Union, the 
decision is only the start: compliance and oversight, or lack thereof, can 
result in many more penalties in the years to come.171 The Financial 
Times reported that Google, along with Opera, was responsible for 
reporting Microsoft to the European Commission for non-compliance 
with the verdict requiring a “browser ballot,” from which both Google 
and Opera benefited.172 That tip resulted in an additional €561 million 
fine being added to the €1.6 billion that Microsoft had paid to the 
European Commission at that time.173 As Microsoft has been instigating 
an investigation into Google for years,174 it is safe to assume that this 
penalty will guarantee that other companies, especially Microsoft, have 
added ammunition to watch Google and ensure that Google complies 
with any penalty that may be given. This has already been seen 
somewhat in Microsoft’s funding of European lobbying group, ICOMP, 
which publicly ridiculed Google’s failure to ask for an oral hearing 
regarding charges earlier this year.175
As already alluded to, India’s competition laws—while very much 
inspired by European competition law176—are applied in a very different 
manner from their inspiration. India’s legal system is based on common 
law, with personal codes that differ based on whether the individual is 
Muslim, Christian, or Hindu.177 However, competition cases are 
adjudicated by the Competition Commission of India, an administrative 
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Kanter & Scott, supra note 11) by 10 and multiplying the resultant number by 4.15. 
 171. Kanter, supra note 91. 
 172. Alex Barker & Richard Waters, Google Tip-Off Leads to Microsoft E.U. 
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body, instead of the court system,178 which is an important distinction. 
The CCI is allowed to impose the highest fines in the entire country and 
it is further allowed to disregard its own prior precedent at its 
discretion.179
The Competition Commission is probably going to pursue this case, 
as they have already assessed a 1 crore rupees penalty (roughly $150,000 
USD at the time of writing) on Google for failing to comply with an 
investigation into Google’s search practices.180 However, this might 
mean that the Competition Commission is not as willing to assess high 
value fines on Google in the event of an unfavorable outcome for the 
tech giant. As stated, the first thing that the Competition Commission 
will consider is what the relevant market should be.181 Due to the lack of 
guidelines182 and inconsistency displayed by the Competition 
Commission,183 this could be the most unpredictable part of the entire 
case for Google.184 However, using the substitution principle upon which 
the Competition Commission has relied in the past,185 it would be safe to 
assume that the relevant market could include all cell phones and 
possibly tablets (since Android operating systems can be found on both 
types of devices) in the country of India. 
The next step would be to determine the extent of the enterprise’s 
dominance in the relevant market.186 Similar to the European 
Commission predicating Microsoft’s dominance on the prevalence of 
Windows,187 the assessment of dominance will probably be based on 
Android’s mobile market share. In December 2015, Android reportedly 
held 64.32% of India’s mobile market share.188 This was the largest 
 178. Shroff & Uberoi, supra note 115, at 1. 
 179. Id. at 5. 
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market share of all companies, with second place (among known 
responses) going to “Nokia Unknown,” at 8.21%.189 Apple’s iOS came in 
7th place, with only 1.82% of the market.190 While market share is not the 
only consideration,191 such a display of dominance, along with the 
intellectual property owned by the enterprise, may push the opinion of 
the Competition Commission towards a finding of dominance in the 
market.192
Finally, the Competition Commission will assess the allegedly 
abusive behavior.193 As the list of offenses in the Competition Act 
appears to be exhaustive, the act of bundling/pre-loading Google’s 
applications onto Android software would have to fit one of the 
categories for the Competition Commission to determine that the 
behavior was abusive.194 The bundling might fall under section 4(c) or 
4(d) of India’s Competition Act of 2002.195 Those categories state that an 
abuse of dominance can be found if a dominant enterprise “(c) indulges 
in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access [in any 
manner]; or (d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts.”196 As explained by the Wall Street Journal “[a]ny phone 
maker can use Android. But if a phone maker wants to use popular 
Google services like Gmail or Maps, or wants access to Google’s Play 
app store—with millions of apps that make phones more useful—it must 
preinstall a package of these Google apps,” which can impose unwanted 
apps on cell phone makers and users.197 Such restrictive contracts could 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/262157/market-share-held-by-mobile-operating-
systems-in-india/. 
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very well fall under section 4(d) of the Competition Act,198 even though 
Google maintains that “device makers ‘are free to install the apps they 
choose, and consumers always have complete control over the apps on 
their devices.’”199 Moreover, these actions do not fall under the exception 
for actions taken by a company in response to competitors in the 
market.200
If the Competition Commission does determine that these actions 
constitute an abuse of dominance by Google, as it seems they would be 
justified in doing from the foregoing analysis, the Competition 
Commission could levy a fine up to 10% of Google’s average turnover 
from the past three years.201 However, estimating how much this could 
add up to would be difficult, considering that COMPAT has said that the 
turnover for calculation purposes must be relevant to the infractions, yet 
at the same time upheld a CCI decision assessing damages based on a 
turnover calculated from overall turnover.202
CONCLUSION
The final decision in the case against Google will be incredibly 
important for future market leaders. Though other companies have not 
yet reached the same levels of market share as Google, Microsoft, and 
Intel, these giants did invoke arguments against competitors during their 
own investigations. Microsoft’s argument to the Court of First Instance 
analogizing their inclusion of Windows Media Player with Apple’s 
inclusion of iTunes fell on deaf ears, due to their dominance.203
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said in 2007 that she hoped to 
see a “significant drop in [Microsoft’s 95% global computer market] 
share” as a result of the Court of First Instance’s verdict.204 Her 
statements, along with the reasoning and communications from the 
Commission and the Courts, appear to make the fact that a dominant 
enterprise is engaging in this behavior the key factor in finding an abuse 
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of dominance.  If this assumption is true, large technology companies 
will not have much to fear, so long as they are not considered the 
dominant player within the specified geographic market.205
In India, the key factor appears to be that the actions by the dominant 
company fall under one of the expressly prohibited provisions of the 
Competition Act. Given that Microsoft and Apple’s minimal market 
share206 will factor against them being declared dominant at the current 
time, their main concern should be identifying which specific provision 
of the Competition Act Google will be charged under, so that they can 
avoid the specific behavior that makes Google’s bundling of products 
illegal under the Competition Act.  
In conclusion, these acts provide the legal basis for what could be a 
costly and damaging ordeal for Google and other technology companies 
moving forward. The odds do not look good: not only is Google’s case 
similar to negative precedent in the European Union, but the European 
Commission has not lost an abuse of dominance case since the 1970’s.207
However, despite the Commission’s history of success, the Commission 
will have to consider that a lengthy legal battle may allow Google to 
“maximize [its] monopoly profits” from the allegedly abusive 
practices.208 This adverse consequence should incentivize the 
Commission to act swiftly when they think an abuse is occurring, 
especially if the monopoly profits are being earned at the expense of the 
very consumers that laws such as these strive to protect.209
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In fact, critics of the Microsoft case allege that this verdict hurt 
consumers instead of protecting them.210 The United States’ Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust, Thomas Barnett, issued a statement 
criticizing the 2007 Microsoft decision, saying that he was “concerned 
that the standard applied to unilateral conduct by the [Court of First 
Instance], rather than helping consumers, may have the unfortunate 
consequence of harming consumers by chilling innovation and 
discouraging competition.”211 Critics also allege that the Microsoft
verdict was all but irrelevant by the time the legal battle was over, 
considering that the version of Windows including Windows Media 
Player sold tens of millions of copies, while the version without 
Windows Media Player, for which the Commission had fought, sold 
fewer than 2,000 copies.212 Furthermore, Windows had already been 
swiftly losing market share to competitors by the conclusion of the case, 
due to innovation in the market and increased accessibility of substitutes 
on the internet.213 Whether this will be Google’s fate during or after any 
case that may ensue is unknown, but it is a possibility that the 
Commission should consider as they assess their case. Regardless of the 
veracity and strength of the claims against Google in the EU and India, 
there are those that say it will be enough that action by the Commission 
means “[a] very big American giant is fined and they change their 
policy.” 214 Based on this fact alone, Google should prepare itself for a 
fight.215
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